Locking Down Entra ID: 5 High-Impact Conditional Access Policies for Day 1
A blueprint of essential Conditional Access policies that immediately block legacy authentication, enforce phishing-resistant MFA for admins, and isolate risky sign-ins without locking yourself out.
Audio Overview: Locking Down Entra ID: 5 High-Impact Conditional Access Policies for Day 1
Listen to the high-level conversation while following along with the code and runbooks below.
When onboarding a new tenant or taking over an existing client infrastructure, Conditional Access (CA) is your primary perimeter.
Default security defaults are a decent start, but they lack granularity, exclusion handling, and emergency access safeguards. Here are the 5 high-impact policies we deploy on Day 1 for every enterprise tenant.
The Non-Negotiable Rule: Break-Glass Accounts First
[!CAUTION] Before creating or modifying a single Conditional Access policy, ensure you have two cloud-only Break-Glass (Emergency Access) accounts with permanent Global Administrator roles, excluded from all CA policies, and protected by hardware FIDO2 keys stored in physical safes.
Create a dedicated Security Group in Entra ID named SG-CA-Emergency-Exclusions and add your break-glass accounts. Every policy below must exclude this group.
Policy 1: Block Legacy Authentication Protocols
Legacy authentication protocols (POP3, IMAP, SMTP AUTH, older ActiveSync) do not support modern MFA challenges, making them prime targets for password spraying attacks.
Policy Configuration:
- Users: All users (Exclude:
SG-CA-Emergency-Exclusionsand any vetted service accounts using Modern Auth). - Target Resources: All Cloud Apps.
- Conditions > Client Apps: Select Exchange ActiveSync clients and Other clients.
- Access Controls > Grant: Block access.
[ Client Request ] ──▶ [ Client App: POP3 / IMAP / MAPI ] ──▶ 🛑 Blocked at Gateway
Policy 2: Phishing-Resistant MFA for Privileged Admin Roles
SMS and standard Microsoft Authenticator push notifications can be defeated via SIM-swapping or MFA fatigue (push bombing). Highly privileged administrators require FIDO2 Passkeys or Certificate-Based Authentication.
Policy Configuration:
- Users: Select directory roles:
- Global Administrator
- Security Administrator
- Privileged Role Administrator
- Exchange & SharePoint Administrator
- Intune Administrator
- Target Resources: All Cloud Apps.
- Access Controls > Grant: Grant access ➔ Require authentication strength: Phishing-resistant MFA.
Policy 3: Enforce MFA for All Users & Register from Trusted Locations
Require all standard standard knowledge workers to perform modern MFA whenever accessing enterprise data.
# Quick PowerShell check via Microsoft Graph for users without registered MFA methods
Get-MgReportAuthenticationMethodUserRegistrationDetail -All |
Where-Object { -not $_.IsMfaRegistered } |
Select-Object UserPrincipalName, IsMfaRegistered, MethodsRegistered
Policy 4: Block Known Risky and High-Threat Sign-Ins
(Requires Entra ID P2 license)
Leverage Microsoft’s threat intelligence to immediately block sessions flagged with high sign-in risk or prompt for password reset on high user risk.
- Conditions > Sign-in Risk: High and Medium.
- Access Controls > Grant: Require multi-factor authentication and compliant device.
Policy 5: Restrict Device Registration and M365 Portal from Unmanaged Endpoints
Prevent users from exfiltrating sensitive client data onto untrusted personal devices.
- Use session controls with Conditional Access App Control (Defender for Cloud Apps) to restrict downloads on unmanaged devices while allowing read-only web view.
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